On the existence of equilibrium in games and economies by Atlamaz, Murat
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Betul 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM  
IN GAMES AND ECONOMIES 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of  
Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
MURAT ATLAMAZ 
 
 
 
In Partial Fullfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
MASTER OF ECONOMICS 
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
ECONOMICS 
BILKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
July 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Economics.
----------------------------------------------------
Associate Professor Dr. Farhad Husseinov
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Economics.
----------------------------------------------------
Professor Dr. Bulent Ozguler
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Economics.
----------------------------------------------------
Assistant Professor Dr. Erdem Basci
Examining Committee Member
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
----------------------------------------------------
Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
Director
  iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND ECONOMIES 
Atlamaz, Murat 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Farhad Husseinov 
 
 
July 2001 
 
 There are three main contributions of this thesis in equilibrium theory.  
The first is about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games.  We find 
sufficient conditions for the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in games with 
discontinuous payoff functions.  In the second one, under time-varying discount 
factors we restate the Folk Theorems on the existence of equilibria of infinitely 
repeated games.  The third one is about the existence of equilibrium in economies 
with indivisible goods.  We re-formulate the model and the existence result of 
Danilov et al(2001) with more realistic cost functions, which depend on prices as 
well as the output level. 
 
Keywords: Existence of equilibrium, ε-Nash equilibrium, discontinuous games, 
time-varying discount factors. 
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ÖZET 
 
OYUNLARDA VE EKONOMİLERDE DENGENİN VARLIĞI ÜZERİNE   
 
Atlamaz, Murat 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. Farhad Hüsseinov 
 
 
Temmuz 2001 
 
 Bu çalõşma ile denge kuramõna üç ana katkõda bulunmak amaçlanmõştõr.  
Birincisi süreksiz oyunlarda dengenin varlõğõ ile ilgilidir.  Bu kõsõmda süreksiz 
kazanç fonksiyonu olan oyunlarda ε-Nash dengesinin varolabilmesi için yeter 
şartlar gösterilmektedir.  İkinci olarak, zamanla değişen indirim katsayõlarõ 
kullanõlarak, sonsuz tekrarlõ oyunlarda dengenin varlõğõna ilişkin Folk teoremleri 
şekillendirilmektedir.  Üçüncü olarak ise bölünemeyen mallardan oluşan ekono-
milerde dengenin varlõğõ ele alõnmaktadõr.  Danilov(2001)in çalõşmasõnda kurulan 
model ve denge varlõk sonuçlarõ, daha gerçekçi olan, üretim miktarõ ile birlikte 
fiyatlara da bağlõ maliyet fonksiyonlarõ kullanõlarak tekrar formüle edilmektedir. 
  
Anahtar sözcükler:  Denge varlõğõ, ε-Nash dengesi, süreksiz oyunlar, zamanla 
değişen indirim katsayõlarõ. 
 
  v 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
  
 
 I wish to express my deepest graditute to Associate Professor Farhad 
Husseinov for his guidance and helpful comments throughout my graduate study.  
I am very thankful to Assistant Professor Erdem Basci for his comments which I 
benefited a lot.  I also wish to thank Assistant Professor Serdar Sayan because he 
believed in me when I promised to complete my graduate study at Bilkent.   
 
 I am indebted to Betul for being so patient with me and supporting me.  I 
am also thankful to Baris Yaslan and Ozcan Koc for their supports and 
friendships.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vi 
 
 
                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT. ......................................................................................................iii 
ÖZET................................................................................................iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................vi 
TABLE OF FIGURES..........................................................................................viii 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....................................................................1 
 
CHAPTER II: NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN STRATEGIC GAMES.........................4 
 2.1 Strategic Games.........................................................................................4 
 2.2 Nash Equilibrium......................................................................................7 
 2.3 Mixed Nash Equilibrium......................................................................10 
2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium.............................................................13 
2.5 ε-Nash Equilibrium.................................................................................16 
 
CHAPTER III: EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN DISCONTINUOUS 
GAMES...............................................................................................21 
 
CHAPTER IV: EQUILIBRIUM IN EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT 
INFORMATION.................................................................................27 
  vii 
4.1 Extensive Games.................................................................................27 
4.2 Extensive Games with Perfect Information............................................29 
4.3 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium........................................................34 
 
CHAPTER V: EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES....................................39 
5.1 Infinitely Repeated Games......................................................................40 
5.2 Folk Theorems.........................................................................................46 
 
CHAPTER VI: EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN PRODUCTION 
ECONOMY WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS......................................53 
6.1 The Model of Production Economy........................................................53 
6.2 Convexification of an Economy..............................................................54 
6.3 Existence of an Equilibrium....................................................................57 
 
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION............................................................................63 
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  viii 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
1. Prissoners Dilemma.......................................................................................5  
2. An example for a strategic game....................................................................6 
3. Another example for a strategic game............................................................9 
4. Another example for a strategic game..........................................................11 
5. Quasi upper semi-continuity.........................................................................23  
6. Two examples for extensive games..............................................................28 
7. Another example for extensive games..........................................................32 
8. Strategic form of an extensive game............................................................35 
9. A stage game for an infinitely repeated game..............................................43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The theory of existence of equilibrium has played a core role in the field of 
game theory.  In developing this theory, the main tool was topological analysis.  
The topological properties of the strategy and/or the commodity sets and the 
behaviours of payoff and/or production functions have determined this 
relationship between the topological issues and Game Theory. 
 
 The concept of equilibrium in Game Theory involves the idea of stability.  
The payoff of any agent depends on the actions of all agents.  On the other hand, 
in General Equilibrium, this concept is directly related to individual constrained 
optimizations by agents of an economy.  In this framework, the payoff functions 
depend only on the behaviour of the owner of this payoff.  However, agents are 
not completely free in solving those individual problems. The market constraints 
create an indirect dependency among the actions of agents and their opponents 
utilities.  In the literature, there are a number of studies such as Shafer and 
Sonnenschein (1975) that establish close relationships among different 
equilibrium concepts of Game Theory and Economics.  
 
 The objective of this paper is to extend some recent results in related areas, 
which deal with the existence of equilibria. 
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 First result that is obtained is inspired by the well-known paper of 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).  We relax some of the continuity assumptions and 
get an existence result for ε-Nash equilibrium as Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) 
guaranteed the existence of Nash equilibrium with some stronger conditions. 
 
 Another result that is presented in this study is about the infinitely repeated 
games.  In the literature such as Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), Abreu (1988) and 
Abreu et al (1994), the basic form of preference relation that captures the 
combined effect of payoffs obtained per period during the infinite time horizon is 
discounted criterion which discounts the future payoffs by a real number (0,1)δ ∈  
that is constant over time.  However, it seems unrealistic to assume the constancy 
of the discount rate over time.  It may be changed in a certain range by external 
effects.  Therefore, in a more realistic framework, assuming the variability of δ, 
some Folk Theorems are restated.   
 
 Our final result concerns with a slightly diverse subject, the General 
Equilibrium.  In a recent paper, Danilov et al. (2001) provided sufficient 
conditions of the existence of equilibria for production economies with indivisible 
goods.  They assumed that cost functions depend only on the level of output that 
would be produced.  However, according to General Equilibrium approach, costs 
also depend on price levels of outputs.  As prices increase, cost of production 
tends to increase for a fixed level of output and vice versa.  The existence theorem 
is restated with more plausible cost functions depending on output and price 
levels.   
  3
 
 This paper is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, the strategic games are 
introduced with some examples and two fundamental existence theorems are 
formulated as Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.  Also, an interesting uniqueness result 
due to Rosen (1965) is stated without its proof.  At the end of this chapter, an 
original result of existence of ε-Nash equilibrium is established as Proposition 3. 
 
 In Chapter 3, the important theorems of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) that 
guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games are stated and 
another original and more advanced existence result of ε-Nash equilibrium is 
established as Theorem 6.   
 
In Chapter 4, we review the extensive games with perfect information to 
prepare ourselves to the concept of infinitely repeated games.  Such games are 
introduced in the following Chapter in which the Folk Theorems are formulated 
and they are restated as Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 with the time-varying 
discounted criterion that is mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.   
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, the model of production economies with indivisible 
goods is presented and the existence theorem is stated as Theorem 9 with more 
realistic production functions, namely, the ones depending on the price and the 
level of output. 
 
Concluding remarks are made in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER II: NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN STRATEGIC GAMES 
 
 
2.1 STRATEGIC GAMES 
 
  A strategic game consists of a finite number of players (N), the strategy 
sets for each player (Si, i ∈ N) and the payoff functions defined on strategy 
profiles (ui, i ∈ N).  The payoff functions give the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility ui(s) for each 1 2( , ,..., )Ns s s s=  of strategies to each player i.  A strategy 
profile is also denoted as ( , )i is s− where 1 2 1 1( , ,..., , ,..., )i i i Ns s s s s s− − += , and S-i is the 
set of all s-i.  Here, abusing notation, the set of players {1, 2,..., }N  is denoted by N. 
 
 If the strategy set of each player is finite, the strategic game is said to be 
finite.  Such games can be shown using matrices.  In the Figure 1, one of the most 
famous games, the prisoners dilemma, is shown in a 2×2 matrix.  The rows are 
the strategies of player 1 while the columns are of player 2, and C, D are the 
labels of strategies of each player such that C and D mean confess and dont 
confess, respectively.  The story behind this game is that two people are arrested 
because of a crime, and they are put into seperate cells so that they have no chance 
to communicate.  They are seperately told that they will be sentenced to three 
years if they both confess whereas one year if they both do not confess.  If only 
one of them confesses, as a reward he will be freed and the other will be sentenced 
to four years.  The minus signs of the numbers in Figure 1 emphasize that the best  
  5
  C D 
C -3,-3 0,-4 
D -4, 0 -1,-1 
 
Figure 1 
 
job they could do is to be free, otherwise the utility in a prison will always be 
negative.  Formally, this game can be formulated as follows: 
              { }1 22,   ,N S S C D= = =  
 
 1 2( , ) ( , ) 3u C C u C C= = −  
 1 2( , ) 0  ,  ( , ) 4u C D u C D= = −  
 1 2( , ) 4  ,  ( , ) 0u D C u D C= − =  
 1 2( , ) ( , ) 1u D D u D D= = −  
 
The crucial point of the story above is that they cannot communicate, 
which is the base of strategic games.  Namely, a player is not informed about what 
the others play, what she knows is just the possible strategies that opponents can 
choose (the strategy sets).  This is summarized accurately in Fudenberg as 
follows: It is helpful to think of players strategies as corresponding to various 
buttons on a computer keyboard.  The players are thought of as being in separate 
rooms, and being asked to choose a button without communication with each 
other. 
 
In a strategic game, the aim of a player is to maximize her payoff.  
Certainly, she will try to do this by choosing her strategy, however, solely her  
  6
 b1 b2 b3 b4 
a1 3, 7 1, 6 7, 5 6, 3 
a2 0, 1 4, 4 5, 1 7, 2 
a3 7, 0 1, 5 0, 6 1, 2 
a4 3, 1 0, 0 2, 1 8, 0 
 
Figure 2 
 
strategy does not suffice.  In Figure 1, let player 1 play C in two different games.  
If her opponent responses by playing C in the first and D in the second game, the 
payoffs of player 1 will be 3 and 4 respectively though her own strategy does 
not change.  Therefore, the strategy is chosen by each player considering the 
opponents strategies assuming that all the players are rational(willing to 
maximize their payoffs). 
 
Which of these strategies are rational to be played? First of all, a strategy 
will not be chosen by any of the players if it is not the best response against a 
strategy of the opponent.  Such a bad strategy is worthless deserving to be 
eliminated.  For instance, consider the game shown in Figure 2.  There are two 
players with the strategy sets { }1 1 2 3 4, , ,S a a a a=  and { }2 1 2 3 4, , ,S b b b b= .  As seen, 
b4 never gives the best payoff for player 2 against any of the strategies of player 1 
so that it is not rational to play b4 in this sense.  The second stage derives from the 
fact that all the players know the irrationality of playing b4.  Thus, player 1 never 
plays a4 which is only a best response to the bad strategy b4 of player 2.  On the 
other hand, player 1 plays a1 if she thinks that her opponent will play b3,  player 2 
plays b3 if she thinks that player 1 will play a3, player 1 plays a3 if she thinks 
  7
player 2 will play b1, player 2 plays b1 if she thinks that player 1 will play a1, and 
so on.  In fact, the strategies in this chain does not lead to a steady state because 
both players are never content in this chain.  Here, the steady state will occur 
when the thoughts of the players agree with each other which leads to Nash 
Equilibrium.  Before introducing this new concept, let us define best response 
formally. 
 
Definition 1  In a strategic game [ ], ( ), ( )i iN S u , strategy is is a best response for 
player i to his opponents strategies is−  if 
( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu s s u s s− −′≥  
 for all i is S′∈ . 
Then, best response correspondence for player i is defined as 
{ }( ) : ( , ) ( , ),  i i i i i i i i i i i iBR s s S u s s u s s s S− − −′ ′= ∈ ≥ ∀ ∈ . 
 
Example 1  Consider the game depicted in Figure 2.  Some best response 
correspondences are 1 1 3( )BR b a= ,  1 2 2( )BR b a= ,  { }2 4 1 3( ) ,BR a b b= . 
 
 
2.2 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 A steady state is better understood with the formal definition of best 
response correspondence.  For instance, for the game of Figure 2, 2 1 2( )a BR b∈  
and 2 2 2( )b BR a∈ .  Thus, both players are content if the chosen strategies are a2 
  8
and b2 for player 1 and player 2, respectively.  Namely, if a prior compromise 
were allowed, the agreement would be on playing a2 and b2 (Though no prior 
information about the opponents actions is stipulated, it does not violate this 
condition to assume informal agreements before the start of the game).  
 
Definition 2  A strategy profile 1 2( , ,..., )Ns s s  is a Nash equilibrium of the game 
[ ], ( ), ( )i iN S u   if is  is a best response to the other players strategies is−  for all i. 
Equivalently, 1 2( , ,..., )Ns s s  is a Nash equilibrium if for every i N∈ , 
                                               ( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu s s u s s− −≥                                                (1)                             
for all i is S∈ . 
 
An important point about this solution concept is that deviation is 
discouraged in a Nash equilibrium.  Namely, if any player herself intends to 
deviate from her strategy, then (1) stipulates that she loses.  This point is clarified 
in the following examples of Nash equilibria in various games. 
 
Example 2  (The Prisoners Dilemma)  In the game of Figure 1, (C,C) is the 
unique Nash equilibrium.  Each of the players gets 4 by deviating from C while 
getting 1 at the Nash equilibrium.  The other profiles do not match this non-
deviation rule.  For instance, examine the profile (D,C).  If player 1 deviates from 
playing D, she gets 3 instead of 4, so deviation is profitable.  This shows that 
(D,C) is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
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 X Y 
X 10, 10 0, 0 
Y 0, 0 1, 1 
 
Figure 3 
 
Example 3  The strategy profile ( )2 2,a b  is a Nash equilibrium of the game shown 
in Figure 2.  
 
Example 4  In the game depicted in Figure 3, (X,X) and (Y,Y) are both Nash 
equilibria even though (X,X) seems more profitable than (Y,Y) for both players.  
 
 
 In these examples, the strategies of Nash equilibria are all deterministic. 
Such strategies are called pure strategies.  However, an alternative notion of 
equilibrium is possible.  Players may choose their strategies, for instance, by 
lotteries so that the strategies are not certain, what is known may be just the 
probability distribution over the strategy set.  Such strategies allow us to define 
mixed extensions of strategic games. 
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2.3 MIXED NASH EQUILIBRIUM  
 
Let [ ], ( ), ( )i iN S u  be a strategic game.  Then the set of probability 
distributions1 over Si  is denoted by ∆(Si), and any element of this set is referred to 
as a mixed strategy of player i.     
 
Definition 3  The mixed extension of the strategic game [ ], ( ), ( )i iN S u  is the game 
[ ], ( ), ( )i iN S u∆  in which ∆(Si) is the set of all probability distributions for player i 
over Si, and ui is defined over ( )i
i
S∆∏  as 
               [ ]1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( ) ( )... ( )  ( , ,..., )i N i N
s S
N Nu s s s u s s sσ σ σ σ σ σ
∈
=∑                (2) 
where iσ  is the probability distribution of player i, and ( )i isσ  is the contribution 
of  the pure strategy  si to iσ . Namely,  
( ) 1
i i
i i
s S
sσ
∈
=∑      for every player i∈N. 
 
The equilibrium concept may be generalized to include the mixed 
strategies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Such probability distribution is formed by player i by randomising over her own pure strategies, 
and this is independent of the other players such randomisations if any. 
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 H T 
H  1,-1 -1, 1 
T -1, 1  1,-1 
 
Figure 4 
 
Definition 4  A mixed strategy profile σ  is a Nash equilibrium if for all players i, 
( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu uσ σ σ σ− −≥  
for every ( )i iSσ ∈∆ . 
 
Example 5  A simple example is the Matching Pennies game shown in Figure 4.  
H and T are head and tail, respectively.  It is easy to see that this game has no 
pure strategy equilibrium.  However, if both players randomize on their own 
strategies with equal probabilities, namely; { }1( ) ( )  for all 1, 2
2i i
H T iσ σ= = ∈ , 
such mixed strategies constitute a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  In fact, it is 
the unique Nash equilibrium.   
 
 As in the previous example, when any player chooses the mixed strategy 
1( ) ( )
2i i
H Tσ σ= =  of Nash equilibrium, the opponent becomes indifferent 
between playing H or T, the pure strategies.  In fact, it is a general property of 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as stated in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1  Let [ , ( ), ( )]i iN S u  be a finite strategic game and i iS S
+ ⊂  be the set 
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of strategies that contribute positively to the mixed strategy of the profile 
( )1 2, ..., Nσ σ σ σ=  for all i N∈ .  Then σ  is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if 
and only if for every player i, si is a best response to iσ−  for all i is S
+∈ . 
 
Proof  Let ( )1 2, ..., Nσ σ σ σ=  be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  Suppose that 
there exists i∈N, and i is S
+∈  such that si is not a best response to iσ− , that is, 
there exists i is S′∈  such that ( ) ( ), ,i i i i i iu s u sσ σ− −′ > .  Then player i can strictly 
increase her payoff by playing is′  instead of si by (2). 
  
 Conversely, suppose that for every player i, si is a best response to iσ−  for 
all i is S
+∈ , and σ  is not a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  Then there exists 
i∈N and ( )i iSσ ′∈∆  such that  
                                              ( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu uσ σ σ σ− −′ ≥                                             (3)    
By (3), there must be pure strategies i is S
+
′∉  and i is S
+∈  that contribute positively 
to iσ ′  and iσ  respectively such that is′  gives a higher payoff than is  which is a 
contradiction.             
 
Example 4 (continued) The game shown in Figure 3 has two pure strategy Nash 
equilibria as it is pointed out in Example 4.  Let 1 2( , )σ σ  be a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium, by Proposition 1, 
                                        1 1 110. ( ) 1. ( ) 1 ( )X Y Xσ σ σ= = −                                       (4) 
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Then 1
1( )
11
Xσ =  , similarly  1
10( )
11
Yσ = . 
Here, (4) follows from the fact that both X and Y are best responses of player 2 to 
1σ  if 2σ  is not a degenerate mixed Nash equilibrium.
2  As a result, choosing X 
with probabilities 1
11
 for both players is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
2.4 EXISTENCE OF A NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
In the previous sections all the games in the examples had at least one 
Nash equilibrium.  Indeed, it is not a chance.  The common property of these 
examples, the finiteness of the games, leads to such a conclusion as stated in the 
following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1 (Nash, 1950)  Every finite strategic game has a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 3 
 
What can be said if the strategy sets are not finite?  In fact, finiteness is a 
strong assumption.  In most applications of Nash Theory to economic theory and 
other areas the strategy sets are not finite, there may be a continuum of strategies.  
For instance, in determination of price of a good by an agent, the set of strategies, 
                                                          
2 At least two of the pure strategies contribute positively to this mixed strategy. 
3 For the well known proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 that use Kakutanis Theorem, the 
readers are referred to  Sundaram (1996 ) and Moulin (1986). 
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the interval of possibly chosen price, is not finite.  The following theorem gives a 
result for existence of Nash equilibrium for pure strategies where the strategy sets 
are not finite.  But before the theorem, let us make a definition.  
 
Definition 5  Let :f D →R  where D is a convex subset of nR .  Let ( )fU a  
denote the upper-contour set of  f at a∈R  such that { }( ) ( )fU a x D f x a= ∈ ≥ .  
Then the function f is said to be quasi-concave on D if ( )fU a  is a convex set for 
each a.   
 
Theorem 2 (Debreu, 1952; Glicksberg, 1952; Fan, 1952)   Suppose that for all 
i N∈ , the strategy set Si is nonempty, convex and compact, the utility function ui 
is continuous over 1 2 ... NS S S S= × × ×  and quasi-concave with respect to si.  Then 
the game [ , ( ), ( )]i iN S u  has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
 Theorem 1 is a special case of this theorem.  The set of mixed strategies 
over a finite set  Si  is a compact, convex set, and the utility functions which are 
linear polynomials are trivially continuous over S∆  and quasi-concave with 
respect to iσ . 
 
 The following are corollaries that are directly derived from Theorem 2.  
The first one is the application for symmetric games.  The latter one is the 
existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the same assumptions except the 
convexity of Sis and the quasi-concavity of uis.   
  15
 
Corollary 1  Let [ , ( ), ( )]i iN S u  be a symmetric game ( 1 ... Nx x= =  and 
( ) ( )i ju s u s′=  if s′  is deduced from s by exchanging si and sj) with convex, 
compact strategy sets, and a utility function ui for each i which is continuous over 
S and quasi-concave with respect to its variable si.  Then this game has a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium s , that is, 1 2 ... Ns s s= = = . 
 
Corollary 2 (Glicksberg, 1952)  Let [ , ( ), ( )]i iN S u  be a strategic game in which 
strategy sets (Si) are nonempty, compact, and utility functions (ui) are continuous 
over S for all i∈N.  Then there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
 These theorems do not say anything about the uniqueness of Nash 
equilibria. One of the most important results, which holds under really strong 
assumptions, is the following. 
   
Theorem 3 (Rosen, 1965)  Let [ ],i i iX a b=  be a compact real interval for all i and 
1 ... NX X X= × × .  Let iu  be a C
2 function defined on X satisfying  
2
2 ( ) 0
i
i
u x
x
∂
<
∂
 
for all x∈X.  Denote by K the n×n matrix with (i,j) entry 2( ) /( )i i ju x x∂ ∂ ∂ .  If  K+Kt 
is negative definite for all x∈X, then the game [ , ( ), ( )]i iN X u  has a unique Nash 
equilibrium.   
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2.5  ε-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 In a Nash equilibrium, each player ensures that she maximizes her utility 
assuming that the opponents play their Nash equilibrium strategies.  She does not 
benefit from deviating from a Nash equilibrium because of this maximization.  
However, in some circumstances, players do not want to leave a steady state, 
though it is not a Nash equilibrium, for a small amount of gain.  Such an approach 
leads to ε-Nash equilibrium. 
 
Definition 6  In a strategic game [ , ( ), ( )]i iN S u , a strategy profile σ  is an ε-Nash 
equilibrium where ε 0>  if for every player i∈N, 
                                           ( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu uσ σ σ σ ε− −≥ −                                          (5) 
for all ( )i iSσ ∈∆ . 
 
 In such a strategy profile, no player can gain more than ε by deviating 
from the profile.  It is a direct consequence that any Nash equilibrium of a 
strategic game satisfies this condition.  
 
Proposition 2  In a strategic game, a Nash equilibrium is always an ε-Nash 
equilibrium for all 0ε ≥ . 
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Proof  Let ( )1 2, ..., nσ σ σ σ=  be a Nash equilibrium.  Then for every player i and 
every ( )i iSσ ∈∆ , 
( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu uσ σ σ σ− −≥  
It follows that (5) is satisfied for any ε>0 which completes the proof.        
 
Let us define upper semi-continuity and lower semi-continuity that we will 
use frequently in this study. 
 
Definition 7  Let Θ and S be subsets of mR  and nR , respectively. A 
correspondence : ( )P SΦ Θ→  is called upper semi-continuous at a point θ ∈Θ  if 
for all open sets V such that ( ) VθΦ ⊂ , there exists an open set U containing θ 
such that Uθ ′∈ ∩Θ  implies ( ) .Vθ ′Φ ⊂   Φ is called upper semi-continuous on  
Θ if Φ is upper semi-continuous at each θ ∈Θ .  In particular, a function 
: nf D ⊂ →R R  is said to be upper semi-continuous at x D∈  if for all sequences 
kx x→ , limsup ( ) ( )k
k
f x f x
→∞
≤ . 
 
Definition 8  A correspondence : ( )P SΦ Θ→  is called lower semi-continuous at 
a point θ ∈Θ  if for all open sets V such that ( ) VθΦ ∩ ≠∅ , there exists an open 
set U containing θ such that Uθ ′∈ ∩Θ  implies ( ) Vθ ′Φ ∩ ≠∅ .  Φ is called 
lower semi-continuous on Θ if Φ is lower semi-continuous at each θ ∈Θ .  In 
particular, a function : nf D ⊂ →R R  is said to be lower semi-continuous at 
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x D∈  if for all sequences kx x→ , liminf ( ) ( )kk f x f x→∞ ≥ , i.e., if f−  is upper 
semi-continuous at x. 
 
The existence theorems are all applicable to ε-Nash equilibrium.  
Moreover, some assumptions made for Nash equilibrium can be weakened while 
applying to ε-Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3  Let [ , ( ), ( )]i iN S u  be a strategic game in which the strategy sets Si 
are nonempty, convex and compact, and let the utility functions ui be continuous 
in is− , upper semi-continuous in s and quasi-concave with respect to si for every i. 
Then there exists an ε-Nash equilibrium. 
 
Lemma 1 4 Let : 2YXϕ →  where X and Y  are convex subsets of Euclidean 
spaces.  If ϕ  is nonempty, convex valued and lower semicontinuous, then there 
exists a continuous function :  such that  ( ) ( )f X Y f x xϕ→ ∈  for all x X∈ . 
 
Lemma 2 5 (Brouwers Fixed Point Theorem)  Let nX R⊂  be compact and 
convex, and :f X X→ a continuous function.  Then f has a fixed point, that is, 
there exists x X∈  such that ( )f x x= . 
 
                                                          
4 Partial case of Theorem 3.1′′′ of E. Michael (1956, p.368). 
5 For the proof the readers are referred to Smart (1974). 
  19
Remark 1  Proposition 3 and Lemma 1 together imply a version of Kakutanis 
Fixed Point Theorem (stated as Lemma 3 in Chapter III) in which lower semi-
continuity replaces upper semi-continuity.  
 
Proof (of Proposition 3)  Let us define  
( )  ( , ) sup ( , )
i i
i i i i i i i i i i
s S
R s s S u s s u s sε ε
− − −
′ ′∈
 
′= ∈ > −    
Moreover, define  
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )N NR s R s R s R s
ε ε ε ε
− − −
= × × × . 
( )i iR s
ε
−
 is nonempty by definition of supremum and convex by quasi-concavity of 
ui with respect to si for any i is S− −∈ . Then the correspondence : 2
SR Sε →  is 
nonempty-, convex-valued.  Let ( )i i is O R s
ε
−
∈ ∩ , that is, 
( , ) sup ( , )    and   .
i i
i i i i i i i
s S
u s s u s s s Oε
− −
′∈
′> − ∈  
Now, we will show that ( ) sup ( , )
i i
i i i i
s S
s u s sϕ
− −
′∈
′=  is upper semi-continuous.   Let 
k
i is s− −→  and let 
k
is  be such that  
                                               1( , ) ( )k k ki i i iu s s s k
ϕ
− −
> − .                                           (6) 
Then without loss of generality, ki is s→  since Si is compact.  Then by (6) and 
using the upper semi-continuity of ui,  
limsup ( ) limsup ( , ) ( , ) ( )k k ki i i i i i i i i i
k k
s u s s u s s sϕ ϕ
− − − −
→∞ →∞
≤ ≤ ≤  
and so ϕi is upper semi-continuous.  
 
  20
Denote ( , ) [ ( ) ] 0.i i i i ia u s s sϕ ε− −= − − >   Since ϕi is upper semi-continuous, 
there exists a neighbourhood of is− , say V1, such that  
                               1( ) ( )      for .  3i i i i i
as s s Vϕ ϕ
− − −
< + ∈                           (7) 
On the other hand, since ui is continuous in s-i there exists a neighbourhood of is− , 
say V2, such that  
                                 2( , ) ( , )       for .3i i i i i i i
au s s u s s s V
− − −
> − ∈                               (8)  
 
Now, by (7) and (8) we have  
( , ) ( , ) > ( ) ( ) ( ) .
3 3 3 3i i i i i i i i i i i i
a a a au s s u s s s a s a sϕ ε ϕ ε ϕ ε
− − − − −
> − − + − > + − − − ≥ −  
Then ( )i i is R s
ε
−
∈  for 1 2is V V V− ∈ = ∩ .  So, ( )i i is O R s
ε
−
∈ ∩  for every .is V− ∈   
Hence, iR
ε  is lower semi-continuous.  Therefore, we have that Rε  is a lower 
semi-continuous correspondence. 
   
Now, we can apply Lemma 1 to this correspondence, namely, there exists 
a continuous function :  such that  ( ) ( )S S s R sεθ θ→ ∈  for all s S∈ .  Then, by 
Lemma 2, there exists a fixed point of the function θ  which is a fixed point of the 
correspondence Rε , and this point is a Nash equilibrium of the game.          
 
 Another theorem for existence of ε-Nash equilibrium with weaker 
conditions is stated in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER III: EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN 
DISCONTINUOUS      GAMES 
 
 
 While considering the existence of Nash equilibrium in strategic games, 
continuity of payoff functions over payoff profiles is generally assumed.  
Nevertheless this is a strong assumption.  In many circumstances, games have 
discontinuous payoff functions.  In a famous paper of Dasgupta and 
Maskin(1986a) two existence theorems for discontinuous games are presented.  
First, they provide conditions that are weaker than continuity and allow the use of 
Kakutanis Theorem to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium.  Second, they provide conditions for the existence of a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium in games without quasi-concave payoff functions.  
These two theorems will be stated in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 without their 
proofs. 
 
Theorem 4 6  Let Si be a nonempty, convex and compact subset of a finite 
dimensional Euclidean space for all i.  Let ui be quasi-concave in si, upper semi-
continuous in s, and have a continuous maximum, that is, ( ) max ( , )
i i
i i i i is S
u s u s s∗
− −
∈
=  
is lower semi-continuous in s-i.  Then there exists a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
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Theorem 5 7  Let Si be a closed interval of R .  Let **( )S i  denote the set of s such 
that ui is discontinuous at s and 
{ }** **( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i iS s s S s s S i− − − −= ∈ ∈  
Let, for any two players i and j, D(i) be a positive integer and for each integer d 
with 1 ( )d D i≤ ≤ , let there exist a finite number of functions :dij i jf S S→ , that 
are one-to-one and continuous such that for each i 
{ }** *( ) ( ) ,   1 ( ) s.t. ( )dj ij iS i S i s S j i d d D i s f s⊆ = ∈ ∃ ≠ ∃ ≤ ≤ =  
Suppose that ui is continuous except on a subset **( )S i  of *( )S i , ( )i
i N
u s
∈
∑  is upper 
semi-continuous, and ( )iu s  is bounded.  Suppose also that ui is weakly lower 
semi- continuous in si, that is, for all i is S∈  there exists [0,1]λ∈  such that for all 
**( )i i is S s− −∈ , 
liminf ( , ) (1 ) liminf ( , ) ( , )
i i i i
i i i i i i i i is s s s
u s s u s s u s sλ λ
− − −
′ ′↑ ↓
′ ′+ − ≥  
Then the game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
 The concepts quasi upper semi-continuity and ε-lower semi-continuity will 
be originally defined to be used in the main theorem of this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
6,7 For the proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, the readers are referred to Dasgupta and 
Maskin(1986). 
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       Figure 5 
 
Definition 9  A function :f X → R  is said to be quasi upper semi-continuous if 
x X∀ ∈ , kx x∀ → , 
( ) liminf ( )kkf x f x→∞≥ . 
 
Clearly upper semi-continuity is a stronger condition than quasi upper 
semi-continuity.   
 
Example 6  Let :f →R R  be a function defined as 
( )f x =
1   if 0
1        if 0
2
0        if 0.
x x
x
x
+ <
=
>
 
As it can be seen from the Figure 5, maximum is not attained by the function f 
whereas any upper semi-continuous function always attains its maximum.  
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Therefore, f is not upper semi-continuous.  It is easy to check that f is quasi upper 
semi-continuous.   
 
Definition 10  A function :f A→R  is said to be ε-lower semi-continuous if 
liminf ( ) ( )
k
k
x x
f x f x ε
→
> −  for all x A∈  and kx A∈  where kx x→ . 
 
 In the following theorem, the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium is 
considered instead which leads to some weaker assumptions compared to 
Theorem 4, that is, for instance, maximum ε-lower semi-continuity is assumed 
instead of maximum continuity, and quasi upper semi-continuity in s with upper 
semi-continuity in si is assumed instead of upper semi-continuity in s.  But before 
stating the theorem, let us recall the Kakutanis Fixed Point Theorem. 
 
Lemma 3 (Kakutanis Fixed Point Theorem)  Suppose that NA⊂ R  is nonempty, 
compact and convex.  Let :f A A→  be an upper semi-continuous 
correspondence and ( )f x A⊂  be nonempty and convex for every .x A∈   Then 
(.)f  has a fixed point; that is, there is an x A∈  such that ( )x f x∈ . 
 
Theorem 6 8 Let in the game [N, (Si),(ui)], Si be nonempty, convex, compact 
subsets in Euclidean spaces, ui be quasi-concave and upper semi-continuous in si 
for all i, and quasi upper semi-continuous in s.  Moreover, assume that for all i, 
                                                          
8 This theorem is originally stated and proved by Farhad Husseinov. 
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the maximum function *( ) max ( , )
i i
i i i i is S
u s u s s
− −
∈
=  is ε-lower semi-continuous.  Then 
for every ε ε′ >  there exists an ε′ -Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof  Fix ε ε′ >  and put 
2
ε εη ′ −= .  Consider η-best response correspondence  
{ }*( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i i i i iR s s S u s s u sη η− − −= ∈ ≥ − . 
Since ui is quasi-concave and upper semi-continuous in si, iR
η  is a nonempty-, 
compact-, convex-valued correspondence.  Denote iR
η  the closure of iR
η , that is, 
( ) ( )i iGr R Gr Rη η= .  First we will show that  
                                     ( ) ( )i i i iR s R s
η ε ′
− −
⊂ , i is S− −∀ ∈                                           (9) 
Let ( )k is Gr Rη∈  and ks s→ .  Then we must show that ( )i i is R sε ′ −∈ , i N∀ ∈ .  
We have *( ) ( )k ki i iu s u s η−≥ −  for all k.  With quasi upper semi-continuity of ui and 
ε-lower semi-continuity of the maximum function, this implies  
* *( ) liminf ( ) liminf ( ) ( )k ki i i i i ik ku s u s u s u sη ε− −→∞ →∞ ′≥ ≥ − ≥ − . 
Therefore ( )i i is R s
ε ′
−
∈  and (9) is proved.  Now, for all i is S− −∈ , ( )i iR s
η
−
 is a 
closed set in the compact convex set ( )i iR s
ε ′
−
.  Hence, 
                                        ( )( ) ( ),  i i i ico R s R s i Nη ε ′− −⊂ ∀ ∈                                           
For the correspondence i
i N
coR coRη η
∈
=∏ , all assumptions of Kakutanis Fixed 
Point Theorem stated as Lemma 3 are satisfied.  By  this theorem, there exists 
s S∈  such that  
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( )( )s coR sη∈  
Therefore, ( )i i is coR s
η
−
∈  for all i N∈ .  This together with (9) gives ( )i i is R s
ε ′
−
∈  
for all i N∈ , so s  is an ε ′ -Nash equilibrium.               
 
 The following consequence of Theorem 6 is obvious. 
 
Corollary 3  Let in Theorem 6, the maximum function *(.)iu  be a lower semi-
continuous for all i.  Then for an arbitrary 0ε > , there exists an ε-Nash 
equilibrium. 
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CHAPTER IV: EQUILIBRIUM IN EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH 
PERFECT INFORMATION 
 
 
 In strategic games, a one shot game is played, the strategies are chosen 
simultaneously for once, and the game is finished.  However, in most of the game 
theory related situations there is time dimension.  Players may act several times 
observing partially or completely opponents past actions.  This is a dynamic 
situation as opposed to the static situation in strategic games.  Such kind of games 
are said to be extensive games. 
 
 
4.1  EXTENSIVE GAMES 
 
An extensive game is a detailed description of the sequential structure of 
the decision problems encountered by the players in a strategic situation (Osborne 
and Rubinstein, 1994).  The extensive form describes the order in which players 
move and what each player knows about the opponents moves when making each 
of her decisions.  This knowledge may be partial or complete as mentioned in the 
introducing paragraph.  If every player knows the previous moves completely, 
these games are called extensive games with perfect information.  If some of the 
players do not know some information about the actions of the other players taken 
previously or a  player forgets the previous moves of herself or she is uncertain  
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Figure 6 
 
 whether another player has acted, such kind of games are called extensive games 
with imperfect information. 
 
Extensive games are illustrated using game trees in which nodes and the 
line segments represent players and their actions, respectively.  In the following 
examples the concept game tree is illustrated. 
 
Example 7  In the extensive game with perfect information depicted in Figure 
6(a), the players move sequentially rather than simultaneously.  Player 1 has two 
choices of move: K or L.  Learning her actual move, the player 2 has three choices 
of move: m, n and p if player 1 plays K, and two choices of move: r and s if player 
1 plays L.  For this reason, player 2 has two decision nodes.  Moreover, if player 1 
and player 2 decide to play, for instance, K and n sequentially, their payoffs will 
be 1 and 4, respectively.       
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Example 8  The game depicted in Figure 6(b) is a simple example to extensive 
games with imperfect information.  Imperfection comes from the information set 
shown by the dots.  The meaning of this information set is that when it is player 
1s second turn to move, she does not know which of these two nodes she is at 
since she could not observe the previous action of player 2.  In this game, the 
player 1 has to decide twice.  In fact, each single node may be interpreted as an 
information set including one node.  Hence, every player acts at each information 
set belonging to herself.  This is why player 1 acts twice instead of three times. 
 
 In the extensive games with imperfect information, generally Nash 
equilibrium (and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that will be defined in Section 
4.3) is not sufficiently powerful so that some other solution concepts such as 
sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium that are all special cases of 
Nash equilibrium are defined and mostly used.  Therefore, we will not study 
further the extensive games with imperfect information. 
 
  
4.2  EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 
 
We start this section with formal definition of extensive games with 
perfect information. 
 
Definition 11  An extensive game with perfect information consists of the 
following components: 
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i. A set N (the set of players) 
ii. A set H of sequences (finite or infinite) that satisfies the following properties: 
° H∅∈  (the empty sequence belongs to H) 
° If ( ) 1,...,k k Ka H= ∈ (where K may be infinite) and M K< , then 
( ) 1,...,k k Ma H= ∈ . 
° If 1,2,...( )k ka =  is an infinite sequence and 1,...,( )k k La H= ∈  for every positive 
integer L, then 1,2,...( )k ka H= ∈ . 
(Each member of H is called history, and a history is composed of actions 
taken by the players.  A history ( ) 1,...,k k Ma H= ∈  is called terminal history if it 
is an infinite sequence or if ( ) 1,..., 1k k Ma H= + ∉ , the set of terminal nodes are 
denoted by T. ) 
iii. A function : /P H T N→  (it assigns to each nonterminal history an element 
of N. ) 
iv. The payoff functions :iU T R→  for each i N∈ . 
 
 The set of all possible actions of a player after a history h is denoted as 
( ) { }( , )A h a h a H= ∈ . 
 
Example 7 (continued)  Let us indicate the components of the game mentioned at 
Figure 6(a).  There are two players, { }1,2N = .  The set of histories is 
{ }, , , , , , ,H K L Km Kn Kp Lr Ls= ∅  where, for instance, Kp is a sequence of actions 
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K and p.  Besides, { }, , , ,T Km Kn Kp Lr Ls= .  The function : /P H T N→  is 
defined as ( ) ( ) ( )1,  2P P K P L∅ = = = .  Finally, the functions :iU T R→  for 
{ }1,2i∈  are the payoff functions giving the outputs (2,3), (1,4),  For example, 
( ) ( )1 21,  4U Kn U Kn= = .  Hence, this game is seen formally to be an extensive 
game with perfect information. 
 
Example 9  Chess is one of the most famous extensive games with perfect 
information.  There are two players W (white) and B (black).  However, it is very 
complex and almost impossible to indicate completely the components of this 
game.  For instance, ( )4,  5,  3E E KF H∈ .  E4 and KF3 are the actions of player 
W, and E5 is the action of player B.  The function P is that if the last action of a 
history belongs to player W and the game continues, then P assigns this history to 
the player B, and vice versa.  The last component, the payoff functions WU  and 
BU  may be the following: 
WU =
1    if  wins the game
1   if a draw is occured
2
0   if  wins the game.
W
B

 
 
BU =
1    if  wins the game
1   if a draw is occured
2
0   if  wins the game.
B
W

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Figure 7 
 
 At playing chess, can it be a strategy to start a game with E4?  It can be at 
most a part of a strategy though it is an action of player W.  Indeed, strategy is 
something different from action.  Roughly speaking, it is an overall plan of a 
game whereas an action is an instant plan. 
 
Definition 12  Let { }( )iH h H P h i= ∈ =  and ( )
i i
i i
h H
A A h
∈
= U  be the set of all 
actions for player i.  A pure strategy for player i is a map :i i is H A→  with 
( ) ( )i i is h A h∈  for all i ih H∈ .  
 
 We denote the set of all pure strategies of player i as Si, and 1 ... NS S S= × ×  
is the set of all strategy profiles. 
 
Example 10  In the game depicted in Figure 7, the pure strategies of player 1 are 
{ }1 , , , , , , ,S acc acd adc add bcc bcd bdc bdd= .  There are three nodes belonging to 
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player 1, and she has an action at each of these nodes.  acd means that a is the 
action decided at the first node, c and d are actions decided at the second and the 
third nodes of player 1.  On the other hand, player 2 has only two nodes at her 
own, and { }2 , , ,S xx xy yx yy= .  Moreover, if 1s acd=  and 2s xy= , then the 
output is the one specified by the path starting from the first node signed with 
arrows in Figure 7.  Hence, 1 1 2( , ) 4u s s =  and 2 1 2( , ) 2u s s = . 
 
 Two results can be obtained from the last example.  First, the number of 
the pure strategies for player i is ( )# ( )
i i
i
h H
A h
∈
∏  which is easy to derive 
arithmetically.  Second and more important one is that, a strategy often specifies 
actions for a player at her nodes that may not be reached due to these actions or 
during the actual play of this game.  For instance, in Example 10, 1adc S∈ , 
however playing a in the first node, player 1 will never reach the third node of 
herself at the right in Figure 7 though she has to specify an action (the action c 
due to the strategy adc) for this node. 
 
 As in the strategic games, mixed strategy of player i is defined as a 
probability distribution over the set of pure strategies of player i.  This concept is 
valuable mostly for extensive games with imperfect information so that we will 
not go further in detail in this direction.   
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4.3  SUBGAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
We start this section defining Nash equilibrium for extensive games with 
perfect information. 
 
Definition 13  Let  [N,H,P,(Ui)] be an extensive game with perfect information.  
A strategy profile 1 2( , ,..., )ns s s s=  is a Nash equilibrium for this game if for 
every i N∈ , 
( , ) ( , )i i i ii iU s s U s s− −≥  for all strategies si of player i. 
 
 In general, it is not easy to find the set of Nash equilibria from the 
extensive form of a game.  For instance, the game mentioned in Example 10 
probably has several Nash equilibria, however from the figure it is hard to 
understand which of the strategy profiles are Nash equilibria.  Now we will state 
the strategic form of an extensive game with perfect information.  
 
Definition 14  Let [N,H,P,(Ui)] be an extensive game with perfect information.  
The strategic form of this game is the strategic game [N,(Si),(ui)] in which Si is the 
strategy set of player i in the game [N,H,P,(Ui)] for each i and ( ) ( )i iu s U s=  for 
every player i and 1 ... Ns S S S∈ × × = . 
 
The games described in Definition 14 are not equivalent indeed.  The 
order of the actions for the first game disappears as expressing it in strategic form              
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 Xx xy yx Yy 
acc 4,2 4,2 0,3 0,3 
acd 4,2 4,2 0,3 0,3 
adc 3,4 3,4 0,3 0,3 
add 3,4 3,4 0,3 0,3 
bcc 1,3 2,1 1,3 2,1 
bcd 0,0 2,1 0,0 2,1 
bdc 1,3 2,1 1,3 2,1 
bdd 0,0 2,1 0,0 2,1 
 
Figure 8 
 
because the strategic game is a one-shot game due to its characterization.  But the 
important common property of these two games is that the sets of Nash equilibria 
of two games mentioned in Definition 14 coincide.  The following example 
illustrates this common property. 
 
Example 10 (continued) In Figure 8 the strategic form of the extensive game 
depicted in Figure 7 is shown.  Using Figure 8 it is easy to see that the set of Nash 
equilibria is { }( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )E bcc yx bcd yy bdc yx bdd yy= .  Pick (bdd,yy).  
According to Figure 7, the decisions of player 1 do not seem to be plausible at the 
nodes followed by the histories (a,x) and (b,x).  It is more plausible to choose c 
which increases the payoff at each node.  In fact, (bcd,yy) and (bdc,yx) also have 
such implausibilities.   
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A new solution concept, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, eliminates 
these undesirable Nash equilibria in the previous example.  But before this 
concept let us see what a subgame is. 
 
Definition 15  A subgame of an extensive game with perfect information 
[N,H,P,(Ui)] is a subset of the game with the following properties: 
(a) This subset begins with a non-terminal node x, 
(b) It contains the nodes that are successors (both immediate and later) of the 
node x, and contains no other node. 
 
Then the game itself is also a subgame.  The subgames excluding the game 
itself are called proper subgames.  The subgames initiating from the nodes whose 
successors are only the terminal nodes are said to be final subgames.  
 
Example 10 (continued) The game shown in Figure 7 has four proper subgames 
two of which start from the nodes of player 2, and the other two start from the 
second and the third nodes of player 1.  The latter two subgames are the final 
subgames of the game.  With the game itself, this game has five subgames. 
 
 As it is seen in the previous example, each non-terminal node of an 
extensive form game with perfect information initiates a different subgame.  
 
 If we consider a subgame in isolation, it is a game itself with the payoffs 
of the original game.  Therefore, the idea of Nash equilibrium can be applied to 
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the new game.  We say that a strategy profile of an extensive game with perfect 
information induces a Nash equilibrium in a subgame if the restriction of each 
players strategy into this subgame constitutes a Nash equilibrium when this game 
is considered in isolation. 
 
Definition 16  A strategy profile of an extensive game with perfect information is 
called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every 
subgame. 
 
 Clearly, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium induces a Nash equilibrium 
in itself so that every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium 
whereas the converse is not true, in general. 
 
Example 10 (continued)  As determined before, the set of Nash equilibria for the 
game depicted in Figure 7 is { }( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )E bcc yx bcd yy bdc yx bdd yy= .  For 
instance, playing c at the final subgame at the left is the unique Nash equilibrium 
if this subgame is considered in isolation.  However ( , )bdd yy E∈ , and the 
strategy bdd of the player 1 does not induce Nash equilibrium in this final 
subgame.  Hence, ( , )bdd yy  is not subgame perfect Nash equilibrium whereas it is 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
 To determine the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a finite 
extensive game with perfect information there is a useful procedure called 
backward induction.  First, the optimal actions at the final decision nodes(those 
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for which the only successor nodes are terminal nodes) are determined.  Then, 
given that these are the actions taken at the final decision nodes, we can proceed 
to the next-to-last decision nodes and determine the optimal actions to be taken 
there by players that anticipate correctly the actions that will follow at the final 
decision nodes, and so on backward through the game tree.  By this procedure, the 
following result is easily derived. 
 
Proposition 4 9 Every finite extensive game with perfect information has a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  Moreover, if no player has the same payoffs 
at any two terminal nodes, then there is a unique subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium.  
 
Example 10 (continued)  By Proposition 4, the game depicted in Figure 7 has 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  The optimal actions are shown by the 
arrows in Figure 7.  Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is ( , )bcc yx . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For the proof the readers are referred to MasColell, Whinston and Green(1995). 
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CHAPTER V:  EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES 
 
 
 In many circumstances such as economics, politics, sociology etc, a game 
is played between the agents, governments or people not once but many times.  
For instance, at each stage, firms adjust the prices of goods they sell regarding the 
demand of consumers or the profits they plan to get so that a kind of game is 
repeated sometimes with improvements in each stage.  Such games are called 
multi-stage game.  The players know all previous actions, but they do not know 
the actions which are displayed by the opponents at the current stage, namely at 
each stage a simultaneous move game is played.  This setup makes possible for 
the players to condition their actions on the previous actions of the opponents. 
 
 A special case of multi-stage games is repeated games in which the 
simultaneous game is played in every stage.  The game that is repeated is called 
stage game.  The important feature about the repeated games is that past actions 
do not affect the set of possible actions or payoff functions at current stage.  In 
repeated games some interesting equilibria may be observed which do not arise 
when the stage game is played once.  These equilibria are caused by 
punishments that will be mentioned in detail in this chapter.   
 
 Due to the length of horizon of a game, repeated games are classified as 
finite and infinite repeated games.  As we will see, the behaviour of players in two 
classes of games is significantly different.  The difference is summarized in 
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) essentially as follows:  The infinite-horizon case is 
a better description of situations where the players always think the game extends 
one more period with high probability; the finite-horizon model describes a 
situation where the terminal date is well-known and commonly foreseen.   
 
 
5.1  INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES 
 
 Before defining an infinitely repeated game formally, it is necessary to 
indicate that throughout the games, the action set of each player is compact and 
the payoff function of each player is continuous.  It is obvious that a repeated 
game is an extensive game.  Though it does not have perfect information we 
model it as if it is an extensive game with perfect information. 10 
 
Definition 17  Let Γ= [N,(Ai),(ui)] be a strategic game and let 1 ... NA A A= × × .  An 
infinitely repeated game of Γ is an extensive game with perfect information 
[N,H,P,(Ui)] in which   
i. { }
1
t
t
H A
=
∞ 
= ∅ ∪  U  where ∅  is the initial history, and 
tA  is the set of the 
sequences ( )
1
tr
r
a
=
 of action profiles in  Γ with length t.   
ii. ( )P h N=  for each non-terminal history h H∈ . 
                                                          
10 Why it does not have perfect information is perceived by the difference of Definition 11 from 
Definition 17. 
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iii. iU  is the payoff function defined on the set A
∞  (the set of terminal histories) 
of infinite sequences ( )
1
r
r
a
∞
=
 of action profiles in Γ. 
 
In this chapter we will use the term strategy for the pure strategies, that 
is, for simplicity the strategy set will be composed of the pure strategies only.  
Recall that a vector nw∈R  is a payoff profile of Γ if there is a strategy profile 
a A∈  of  Γ such that ( )i iw u a= for every .i N∈   A vector w is called a feasible 
payoff profile if it is a convex combination of the payoff profiles in A, that is, 
there exists { }1,..., Ka a A⊂  such that for each i, 
1
( )K ki k ikw u aβ==∑  
where 
1
1K kk β= =∑  and kβ  is a nonnegative rational number for every 
{ }1,...,k K∈ .  We choose kβ s rational for simplicity. 11  Notice that ( )a a Aβ ∈  is 
independent of i. 
 
 There are several alternative specifications of payoff functions for the 
infinitely repeated games.  We will focus mostly on the case in which the players 
discount future utilities with the discount factor 1δ < .  In this specification, the 
payoff function of player i is 
                                                 1
1
(1 ) t ti
t
wδ δ
∞
−
=
− ∑                                                   (10) 
                                                          
11 In general, these coefficients are assumed to be real numbers. 
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where wt is the payoff profile of the stage game in period t.  The term (1-δ) in (10) 
is to normalize the summation so that the gain of a player receiving 1 per period is 
one.  Then 1
1
(1 ) t ti
t i N
wδ δ
∞
−
= ∈
 
−  ∑  is a payoff profile of the δ-discounted infinitely 
repeated game.  We assume that Ai is compact for each i, this is why the value in 
(10) is always finite.  Under discounted criterion, the value of a given gain 
diminishes over time.   
 
 Any players expected payoff from period t on, which is the payoff of the 
proper subgame that begins at period t, can be computed.  We call this the 
continuation payoff and formulate it as follows: 
(1 ) t i
t
wτ τ
τ
δ δ
∞
−
=
− ∑  
where iw
τ  is defined as in (10). 
 
 Another specification of payoff function is said to be time-average 
criterion in which the periods are treated equally so that the discount factor is 
thought as if δ=1.  The payoff function of the player i in this criterion is 
                                                 
1
1liminf
T
t
iT t
w
T→∞
=
∑                                                    (11)  
We take limit infimum of the summation in (11) since some infinite sequences 
have no well defined average values. 
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  C D 
C   0, 0 2,-1 
D -1, 2 1, 1 
 
Figure 9 
 
 In the time-average infinitely repeated games the players are unconcerned 
not only about the timing of payoffs but also about the payoffs for finite number 
of periods. For instance, the sequences (0,0,1,1,1,0,) and (0,0,0,) are equally 
preferred having the same average zero. 
 
 Another specification, overtaking criterion, has the advantage of treating 
all the periods equally and considering the changes importantly in finite number 
of periods.  However, this specification cannot be specified by a payoff function.  
In this criterion, the sequence ( )tiw  is preferred to ( )
t
iy  if and only if  
( )
1
liminf 0
T
t t
i iT t
w y
→∞
=
− >∑ . 
 
Example 11  The game shown in Figure 9 has unique Nash equilibrium which is 
(C,C).  This strategy profile gives zero to each player.  Despite this, both players 
are better off when they play D.  In the repeated version of this game, playing 
(D,D) may be an equilibrium if the players believe that a deviation will terminate 
playing (D,D) resulting in a long-term loss for them that outweighs their short-
term gains.   
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 Suppose that both players play D at each period.  The payoff of each 
player is  
1
1
(1 ) t
t
δ δ
∞
−
=
− ∑  
which is equal to 1, where 1tiw =  for all t and {1, 2}i∈ . 
 
 Suppose that the output is (C,D) at the odd periods and is (D,C) at the even 
periods.  Then the payoff of player 1 is 
1 1
 odd  even
(1 ) .2 (1 ) .( 1)t t
t t
δ δ δ δ− −− + − −∑ ∑  
which is equal to 2
1
δ
δ
−
+
.  On the other hand, the payoff of player 2 is  
1 1
 odd  even
(1 ) .( 1) (1 ) .2t t
t t
δ δ δ δ− −− − + −∑ ∑  
which is equal to 2 1
1
δ
δ
−
+
.   
 
 What can be said about the Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games?  
The following result shows that if the stage game has some Nash equilibria, the 
infinitely repeated game has trivial subgame perfect Nash equilibria. 
 
Proposition 5 12  Let E S⊂  be the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the 
stage game [N,(Ai),(ui)], then any strategy profile :s H T E→\  is a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game.  
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 This proposition shows that repeated play of a game does not decrease the 
set of equilibrium payoffs.  In fact, for infinitely repeated games there exist other 
equilibria which do not play the Nash equilibria of the stage game in every period.  
These equilibria are formed by trigger strategies that are used in Folk Theorems.  
Before stating Folk Theorems in the next section, let us introduce minmax value 
that is used at the construction of the trigger strategies. 
 
Definition 18  Let Γ= [N,(Ai),(ui)] be a strategic game.  The player is minmax 
value in Γ is 
                                           min max ( , )
i i i i
i i i ia A a A
v u a a
− −
−
∈ ∈
=                                            (12) 
 
A payoff profile w is called enforceable if i iw v≥  for all i N∈  and w is called 
strictly enforceable if i iw v>  for all i N∈ .  We denote by i ip A− −∈  one of the 
solutions of the minimization problem in (12). 
 
Example 11 (continued)  In the game shown in Figure 9, the minmax value of 
each player is 0.  Hence, (0,0) is enforceable and (1,1) is strictly enforceable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
12 The readers are referred to Fudenberg and Tirole(1991) for the proof.. 
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5.2  FOLK THEOREMS 
 
Theorem 7 (Nash Folk Theorem)  Let w be a strictly enforceable feasible payoff 
profile of Γ= [N,(Ai),(ui)].  There exists a 1δ <  such that for all ( ,1)δ δ∈ , the δ-
discounted infinitely repeated game of  Γ has a Nash equilibrium with the payoff 
profile w. 
 
Proof  We know that i iw v>  for all i N∈  because of strict enforceability.  Let us 
construct the strategy of the player i such that if the strategy of every player is as 
constructed, then the payoff profile will be w and the strategy profile will 
constitute a Nash equilibrium.  First it is given that w is feasible, that is, there 
exists ( )( )
1
t
t
a
∞
=
 yielding payoff profile w where ( )ta  is the strategy profile of the 
stage game at t-th period. 
 
 Consider the following strategy for player i that chooses ( )tia  in each 
period t so long as the realized action in the previous period is ( 1)ta −  or at least two 
players deviate from ( 1)ta − .  If there is only one player, say player j, deviated from 
( 1)ta −  in the previous period, this strategy will suggest that player i will play 
( )j ip−  for the rest of the game. 
 
 We claim that the strategy profile with these strategies for each player i is 
a Nash equilibrium.  At this strategy profile player i gets ( )1 ( )
1
(1 ) t ti
t
u aδ δ
∞
−
=
− ∑ .  
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Suppose that player i deviates at period t.  Then her continuation payoff from 
period t on is at most 
(1 ) max ( )i ia A u a vδ δ∈− +  
Let us take the critical value  iδ  for player i satisfying 
                          (1 ) max ( ) (1 ) min ( )i i i i i i i ia Aa A u a v u a wδ δ δ δ∈∈− + = − +                        (13) 
 
The continuation payoff for the non-deviating case is 
( )( )(1 ) ti iu a wδ δ− +  
which is at least as large as ( )(1 ) min i iu a wδ δ− + .  When we take  iδ δ> , then 
by (13) 
(1 ) min ( ) (1 ) max ( )i i i ia A a Au a w u a vδ δ δ δ∈ ∈− + > − + . 
Thus, we get 
( ) ( )( )(1 ) (1 ) maxti i i ia Au a w u a vδ δ δ δ∈− + > − +  
which shows that player i does not gain by deviating. 
 
 As we choose  max ii Nδ δ∈= , no player gains by deviating from her strategy.  
Hence, the strategy profile specified above is a Nash equilibrium.          
 
 The strategy constructed in this proof is a trigger strategy in which other 
players punish the deviator forcing her to get at most her minmax value.  
Certainly, punishing the deviator forever is costly.  At this point, we reintroduce 
the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that rules out such costly 
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strategies since subgame perfection requires that each players gain after every 
history be optimal.  In the following theorem that was firstly stated by 
Friedman(1971) the conclusion of Nash Folk Theorem is applied to the case of 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 8  Let a  be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game [N,(Ai),(ui)] such that 
( )i iu a y=  for all i N∈ .  For any feasible payoff profile w with i iw y>  for all i, 
there is a 0 1δ< <  such that for all δ δ>  there exists a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the δ-discounted infinitely repeated game with payoff profile w. 
 
Proof  Let us construct the strategy of the player i with payoff profile w.  First, it 
is given that w is feasible, that is, there exists ( )( )
1
t
t
a
∞
=
 yielding payoffs w where 
( )ta  is the strategy profile of the stage game at t-th period.  The strategy of player i 
will suggest ( )tia  for the t-th period unless someone deviates in the previous period 
in which case it suggests ia  for the rest of the game.  Notice that the number of 
deviators is not important.  
 
 This strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large 1iδ <  
satisfying  
                                      ( )(1 ) maxi i i i ia A u a y wδ δ∈− + <                                          (14) 
The left-hand-side of (14) is the continuation payoff of player i from period t on 
when she deviates, and right-hand-side of (14) is the continuation payoff of player 
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i for non-deviation case.  There exists a iδ  where (14) holds with equality because 
at the limit 1iδ =  it holds with inequality.  Hence, for i iδ δ> , (14) is satisfied.  
Then the critical value is max ii Nδ δ∈=  at which (14) is satisfied for all i. 
 
 If someone deviates, the strategies suggest playing a  forever which is a 
Nash equilibrium of the stage game.  Then by Proposition 5, nobody gains by 
deviating at any subgame of the infinitely repeated game.  Therefore, the strategy 
profile specified above is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.          
 
 In the δ-discounted infinitely repeated games we have assumed that the 
discount factor for each period is the same, that is, δ is independent of t.  
However, this is not always the case.  In the real world, the environments acting 
as the discount factor may change as time goes up.  Consider real interest rates or 
the depreciation rates that are not fixed over time.  Therefore, it will be 
meaningful to introduce a new criterion that assumes the discount factors varying 
over time.  We call it time-varying discounted criterion and specify it with the 
following payoff function for each i 
1
1
1 0
1 0
1 t t
it
t
t
wτ
τ
τ
τ
δ
δ
−∞
−∞
= =
= =
       
∑ ∏
∑ ∏
 
where tw  is the payoff profile of the t-th period, (0,1)τδ ∈  for each 1τ ≥ , and 
0 1δ = .  The term before the summation is to normalize the total payoff such that a 
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person receiving 1 in each period gets 1 as the final output.  Notice that time-
varying discounted criterion is a generalization of δ-discounted criterion.  
 
 In the rest of this section we will restate the Folk Theorems and prove 
them for time-varying discounted criterion.  The following two results are the 
restatements of Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, respectively. 
 
Proposition 6  Let w be a strictly enforceable feasible payoff profile of 
Γ=[N,(Ai),(ui)].  There exists a 1δ <  such that for all sequences 1( )τ τδ ∞=  satisfying 
( ,1)τδ δ∈  for every τ +∈Z , time-varying discounted infinitely repeated game of 
Γ  has a Nash equilibrium with payoff profile w.  
 
Proof  We will use the same strategies constructed in the proof of Theorem 7 to 
prove this existence result.  At this strategy profile each player i gets 
( )1 ( )
1 0
 
t
t
i
t
u aτ
τ
δ
−∞
= =
   ∑ ∏ .  Take  the critical value iδ  satisfying  
                                (1 ) max ( ) (1 ) min ( )i i i i i i i ia Aa A u a v u a wδ δ δ δ∈∈− + = − +                   (15)                  
for every player i. 
 
 Let us construct the sequence 1( )τ τδ ∞=  such that iτδ δ>  for all τ.  The 
continuation payoff of player i from period t on when she does not deviate is  
                                           ( )( )1 1 1t ti it t
Su a w
S S
+
+ +
                                            (16)   
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where 
s
t
s t t
S τ
τ
δ
∞
= =
 
=   ∑ ∏ .  The expression in (16) is obviously at least as large as 
1 min ( )
1
t
i ia A
t t
Su a w
S S∈
+
+
.  Suppose that player i deviates at period t.  Then her 
continuation payoff from period t on is at most 1 max ( ) .
1
t
i ia A
t t
Su a v
S S∈
+
+
  From (15) 
and using the fact that i iw v> , we can deduce that  
1 1min ( ) max ( )
1 1
t t
i i i ia A a A
t t t t
S Su a w u a v
S S S S∈ ∈
+ > +
+ +
. 
Then we get 
( )1 1( ) max ( )
1 1
t t t
i i i ia A
t t t t
S Su a w u a v
S S S S∈
+ > +
+ +
 
which shows that player i losses by deviating.  Therefore, the strategy profile 
specified above is a Nash equilibrium.              
 
Proposition 7  Let a  be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game [N,(Ai),(ui)] such 
that ( )i iu a y=  for all i N∈ .  Then for any feasible payoff profile w with i iw y>  
for all i, there is a 0 1δ< <  such that for all 1( )τ τδ ∞=  satisfying ( ,1)τδ δ∈  for all τ, 
there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the time-varying discounted 
infinitely repeated game with payoff profile w. 
 
Proof  The same strategies that are constructed in the proof of Theorem 8 will be 
used in this proof.  We claim that this strategy profile will constitute a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium of the time-varying discounted  infinitely repeated game. 
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 If player i deviates at period t, the continuation payoff from period t on is 
1 max ( )
1 1
t
i ia A
t t
Su a y
S S∈
+
+ +
 
where 
s
t
s t t
S τ
τ
δ
∞
= =
 
=   ∑ ∏ .  What she gets in no deviation case is .iw   We know that 
i iw y>  for all i.  Hence, 
                                      1 max ( )
1 1
t
i i ia A
t t
Sw u a y
S S∈
> +
+ +
                                      (17)   
for 1( )τ τδ ∞=  satisfying iτδ δ>  for sufficiently large .iδ   Let max ii Nδ δ∈= , then (17) 
holds for all i when 1( )τ τδ ∞=  satisfies iτδ δ>  for all τ.  Hence, the strategies 
suggested above constitute a Nash equilibrium.   
 
 To show that this strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
assume that someone deviates, then the strategies suggest playing a  forever and 
by Proposition 5, this is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting from the 
deviation.  Therefore, the strategy profile specified in the proof of Theorem 8 is a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.             
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CHAPTER VI:  EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN 
PRODUCTION ECONOMY WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS  
 
 
6.1  THE MODEL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMY 
 
A production economy with a finite number of consumers and producers is 
considered.  There are finite number of indivisible goods and a perfectly divisible 
good that is called money.  To be more precise, the commodity space is of the 
form K ×Z R . 
 
Each producer has a cost function : { }K Klc + +× → ∪ +∞Z R R .  The 
indivisible goods that will be used for the production and the price level of the 
market for these goods will determine the total cost of a producer. 
 
Consumer h has a preference hf  on 
K
+ +×Z R .  As usual, we assume that 
each preference is complete, transitive and closed.  It is also non-decreasing in 
indivisible goods and increasing in money.  Each consumer is endowed with 
( )h , KhW w + +∈ ×Z R  and shares in the firms 0lhθ ≥ , l L∈  where 1lh
h H
θ
∈
=∑  for any 
l L∈ . 
 
A discrete economy ε  is  
{ }( , ( , ), ( ), ), ; ( ),h h h lh lW w l L h H c l Lθε = ∈ ∈ ∈f . 
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There is perfect competition and prices are normalized such that the price 
of money is unity. 
 
Definition 19  ( )( , ) ;( ) ;h h h H l l LX m Y p∈ ∈  is a competitive equilibrium in the 
economy ε  if 
(a) For all l∈L, Yl maximizes the profit of producer l: 
arg max . ( , )
K
l l
Y
Y p Y c p Y
+∈
∈ −
Z
. 
(b) For all h∈H, ( , )h hX m  is a best allocation in the budget set 
{ }( ) ( , ) . ( )Kh hB p X h p X m pβ+ += ∈ × + ≤Z R  with respect to the 
preference hf where ( ) . ( )h h h lh l
l L
p pW w pβ θ π
∈
= + +∑ . 
(c) Markets clear:   h h l
h H h H l L
X W Y
∈ ∈ ∈
= +∑ ∑ ∑    and   ( )h l l h
h H l L h H
m c Y w
∈ ∈ ∈
+ =∑ ∑ ∑ . 
 
 
6.2 CONVEXIFICATION OF AN ECONOMY 
 
To convexify the economy ε  defined in the previous section, we will 
convexify the preferences and the cost functions. 
 
Let : { }Kf → ∪ +∞Z R .  Denote by { }( ) ( , ) ( )Kepi f x t t f x= ∈ × ≥Z R  
the epigraph of  f. 
  55
 
Definition 20  The convexification of f is a function ( ) : { }Kco f → ∪ +∞R R  
whose epigraph is the closure of convex hull of ( )epi f  i.e. 
( ( )) ( ( ))epi co f co epi f= .  
 
 The epigraph of ( )co f  is a closed convex set, namely, ( )co f  is a closed 
convex function. 
 
Definition 21  A function : { }Kf → ∪ +∞Z R  is pseudoconvex if 
(a) ( ( ))co epi f  is a closed subset of K ×R R , and 
(b) for every Kx∈Z , ( ) ( )( )f x co f x= . 
 
To convexify the preferences, we need to represent them with some 
functions.  To do this, we make the following two assumptions: 
•  For every h∈H and KY +∈Z , ( , ) ( ,0)h h hW w Yf , 
• For every h∈H and (X,m) with 0m ≥ , there exists m +′∈R  such that    
(0, ) ( , )hm X m′ f . 
 
Under these assumptions, let ( , ) inf{ (0, ) ( , )}h ht X m m m X m′ ′= f , then 
(0, ( , )) ( , )h ht X m X m∼"! .  We also have the money equivalent of the initial 
endowment which we denote by 0hm , i.e.  
0(0, )) ( , )h h h hm W w∼"! .  Then, for any 
0
hm m≥ , there exists a unique function :
m K
hq + +→Z R  satisfying 
  56
(0, ) ( , ( ))mh hm X q X∼"!  for all KX +∈Z .  Thus, the family of functions that represent 
the preferences is obtained.  We convexify these functions as specified in 
Definition 20. 
 
The convexification of cost functions is similar.  The only difference is 
that functions domain will transform from K K×Z R  to K K×R R  in this case. 
 
In the rest of this section, a conditional existence result for production 
economies with indivisible goods is presented.  Before doing this, we shall define 
supply and demand correspondences.  Given price level p, let 
( ) arg max  ( . ( , ))
K
l l
Y
S p p Y c p Y
+∈
= −
Z
 be the supply of the producer l∈L and ( )lD p  be 
the set of all KhX +∈Z  such that ( , ) ( , ( ) . ))h h h h hX m X p p Xβ= −  is a best 
allocation in ( )hB p  with respect to the preference hf . 
 
Definition 22  A set D of subsets of KZ  is said to be a class of discrete convexity 
if the following two hold: 
(a) For any A∈D, A=co(A)∩ KZ  
(b) For any A,B∈D, A ± B∈D. 
 
Proposition 8  Let ε  be a discrete economy.  Assume that there exists an 
equilibrium price p* for the convexified economy ( )co ε , and there exists a class 
D of discrete convex sets such that at the price p*, the demands Dh(p*) for every 
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h∈H and the supplies Sl(p*) for all l∈L belong to D.  Then p* is an equilibrium 
price for ε . 
 
 
6.3  EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions for the existence of an 
equilibrium of a convexified economy.  But before stating the theorem, let us 
define aggregate utility and aggregate cost functions for individual utility 
functions : Khu + →R R , h H∈  and the individual cost functions 
: { },  K Klc l L+ +× → ∪ +∞ ∈R R R "  under the assumption of transferable utility 
functions(i.e. quasi-linear with respect to money).  The aggregate utility and cost 
functions are 
,
( ) sup ( )
K
h h
h h
x x x h H
U x u x
+= ∈ ∈
 
=   ∑ ∑R  for all 
Kx +∈R , 
                 
,
( ) inf ( , )
K
l l
p
l l
x x x l L
C x c x p
+= ∈ ∈
 
=  ∑  ∑R  for all 
Kx +∈R , Kp +∈R . 
 
Lemma 4  With the assumption of transferable utility functions, the aggregate 
functions pC  and U satisfy  
                                                  ( ) ( )l
l L
S p S p
∈
=∑ ,                                          
                                                  ( ) ( )h
h H
D p D p
∈
= ∑                                            
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where ( )( ) arg max . ( )
K
p
x
S p p x C x
+∈
= −
R
, ( )( ) arg max ( ) .
Kx
D p U x p x
+∈
= −
R
, 
( )( ) arg max . ( , )
K
l l
x
S p p x c x p
+∈
= −
R
 and ( )( ) arg max ( ) .
K
h h
x
D p u x p x
+∈
= −
R
. 
 
Theorem 9  Let ε  be a discrete economy.  A competitive equilibrium exists in 
the convexified economy ( )co ε  if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) For every h∈H and KY +∈Z , ( , ) ( ,0)h h hW w Yf , 
(2) For every h∈H and (X,m) with 0m ≥ , there exists m +′∈R  such that 
(0, ) ( , )hm X m′ f , 
(3) The functions mhq  are pseudoconvex for all h∈H and 
0
hm m≥ , 
(4) The cost functions cl are pseudoconvex for all l∈L, 
(5) The total endowment of indivisible goods is strictly positive: 
0h
h H
W W
∈
= >∑ , 
(6) inf ( , )
K lp
c Y p
+∈
→ +∞
R
 as Y →+∞  for all l∈L.  
 
Proof  There exists by condition (6) a production level * KZ +∈Z  such that 
( )p h
h H
C z w
∈
> ∑  for any *Z Z≥  and Kp +∈R  where 
,
( ) min ( , )
K
l l
l L
p
l l
Z z z l L
C Z c z p
∈
= ∈
∈
= ∑ ∑Z .   
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 Denote by Th the amount of money satisfying *(0, ) ( , )h h h
h H
T W Z w
∈
∼ + ∑"!  
for all h∈H.  Then the function hThq  satisfies 
*( ( ), ) ( , )hTh h h
h H
q X X W Z w
∈
∼ + ∑"!  for 
all h∈H. 
 
 We define h%f  as follows: 
 ( )mhq X =%
0( )       for all  when 
( )       for all  when >h
m K
h h h
T K
h h h
q X X m m T
q X m T X m T
 ∈ ≤ ≤ + − ∈
Z
Z
 (18) 
where (.)mhq%  is a function that represents the modified preferences h%f  in the same 
way as specified for (.)mhq  in the previous section. 
 
 Let { }, ( , ) ;( )h h h h H l l LW w cε ∈ ∈= %f%  be the modified economy.  Assume that 
this modified economy has an equilibrium.  Any such equilibrium satisfies 
*
hX W Z≤ + , h h
h H
m w
∈
≤ ∑  for every h∈H.  So, the indifference levels of the 
preferences hf  and h%f  coincide.  Hence, we can assume that (18) holds for ε . 
 
 Let { }0 ,K kQ p p q k K+= ∈ ≤ ≤ ∀ ∈R "  where h
h H
q T
∈
= ∑ .  We construct the 
correspondence :P Q Q→  in the proceeding paragraphs. 
 
 Define { }*( ) inf : ( ) ( ) . , ,m Kh h hm p m q X p p X X X W Zβ += ≥ − ∈ ≤ +Z  for all 
h∈H and define also ( )( ) ( ) ( )hm pph h hu X m p q X= −  for all 
KX +∈Z , h∈H.  Here, 
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mh(p) is independent of X, so (.)phu  are pseudoconcave for all h∈H,  p∈Q and are 
bounded by Th for any p∈Q because of (18).  Now, let the aggregate utility and 
aggregate cost functions be defined as follows: 
( ) max ( )
h
p p
h h
x x h H
U x u x
=
∈
 
=  ∑  ∑  for all 
Kx +∈R , 
( ) min ( )( , )
l
p
l lx x l L
C x co c x p
=
∈
 
=  ∑  ∑  for all 
Kx +∈R  
where  ( )u co u= − − .  Here, pU is bounded by q, then the maximization problem 
max ( ) ( )
K
p p
x
U W x C x
+∈
+ −
R
 
has a solution xp.  Denote ( ) ( )p p p pM U W x C x= + − .  Then, for any Kx +∈R , 
( ) ( ).p pC x M U W x+ ≥ +   Hence, there is a linear function p′  such that  
                 ( ) ( ) ( )p pC x M p x M U W x′+ ≥ + ≥ +   for all Kx +∈R .                       (19)          
 
 Let P(p) be the set of p′ s satisfying (19).  For any ( )p P p′∈ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0p p p p p p pU W x p W x U W x C x′+ − + ≥ + − ≥ .  Then this implies 
( ) ( ) ( )p p pq U W x p W x p W′ ′≥ + ≥ + ≥ .  We know that 1W ≥ , then kp q′ ≤  for all 
k∈K.  Therefore, ( )P p q⊂ , i.e. : .P Q Q→  
 
 P(p) is convex and compact for all p∈P and P is closed.  Thus, we can use 
Kakutanis Theorem to conclude that P has a fixed point * *( )p P p∈ .  What 
remains is to show that p* is an equilibrium price for ( )co ε . 
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 ( *)hm phq  touches the budget set 
*( )hB p , so the following equality holds 
( )* * *( ( )) arg max ( ) .
K
p
h h
x
co D p u x p x
+∈
= −
R
. 
We also have 
( )* * *( ( )) arg max . ( )
K
p
l
xl L
co S p p x C x
+∈∈
= −∑
R
. 
 
 Thus, using Lemma 4, we have 
( ) ( )* *( ) ( ) .h l
h H l L
W co D p co S p
∈ ∈
∈ −∑ ∑  
 
 Hence, p* is an equilibrium price for the convexified economy ( )co ε% .  
Therefore, a competitive equilibrium exists in ( )co ε .          
 
 We may combine this theorem with Proposition 8 to reach a result of 
existence of equilibrium for a discrete economy ε.  So, let us define a new class of 
sets. 
 
Definition 23  Let D be a class of discrete convexity in KZ .  A pseudoconvex 
function : { }Kf → ∪ +∞Z R  is called D-convex if the following holds for any 
Kp +∈R , 
( )arg max . ( ) .
Kx
p X f X D
∈
− ∈
Z
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 Using Proposition 8, the following corollary of the last theorem follows. 
 
Corollary 4  Let ε  be a discrete economy.  A competitive equilibrium exists in ε 
if the conditions of Theorem 9 are satisfied in addition to the following condition: 
• There exists a class D of discrete convexity such that the functions mhq  for 
all m +∈R , h H∈  and the cost functions cl 13 for all l L∈  are D-convex. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 cl  is D-convex if for any 
Kp
+
∈R  
( )arg max . ( , ) .
K
l
X
p X c X p D
∈
− ∈
Z
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CHAPTER VII:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In this paper, we have been interested in the concept of equilibrium.  
Starting with the basic definitions of certain types of equilibrium, we have 
concentrated on some fundamental and recent results about the existence of 
equilibrium.  We have extended two Nash equilibrium existence theorems to ε-
Nash equilibrium framework by weakening some conditions.   
 
 Another result that we have pointed out was the generalization of the 
discounted criterion of infinitely repeated games. 
 
 Finally, we have re-formulated the model and the existence theorems of 
competitive equilibrium in production economies with indivisible goods with 
more accurate assumption for the production functions.  We have used the same 
definitions and notations of Danilov et al. while formulating the model and 
proving the result. 
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